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The paper deals with the issue of budget setting to the divisions of a com-
pany. The approach is quantitative in nature both in the formulation of the
requirements for the set-budgets, as related to different general managerial
objectives of interest, and in the modelling of the inherent uncertainties in
the divisions’ revenues. Solutions are provided for specific cases and con-
clusions are drawn on different aspects of this issue based on analytical and
numerical analysis of the results. From a more general standpoint the paper
is also intended to set the ground for a schematic and precise approach to the
managerial problem of budget-setting.
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1 Introduction
We study the issue of setting budgets to the divisions of a company by its top
manager. In this paper we consider budget setting for revenue budgets, but the
models and results can easily be adapted to cost budgets. Budget setting is an
important policy device with various managerial aspects. Primarily it entails the
determination of the total company budget, which is by definition the sum of the
divisional budgets. The top manager wants this total budget to be realistic in terms
of achievability (i.e., the probability that the revenues of the company as a whole
will be at least the set budget). Then there are managerial and organizational
objectives that the budget setting serves or can promote. In this paper we shall
focus on two types of objectives: one relates to the achievability of the set budget in
the divisions, the second - to the responsiveness of the set budget to those proposed
by the divisions’ managers, measured by the ratio of the set budget to the proposed
one. Then there is the overall objective of “fairness”, i.e., treating the managers
equally in terms of the above two objectives.
Given these objectives and the above mentioned primary goal of achievability
of the total budget for the company as a whole, the top manager can formulate
decision problems whose solutions are the required set budgets. There are differ-
ent possibilities here and thus the first stage of the analysis is creating a scheme
of problem-formulation variations of interest. Solving such problems for a variety
of modelling situations is the next stage. Then, the results obtained for the divi-
sional budgets are used to demonstrate, analytically or by numerical analysis, some
fundamental aspects of the budgeting solutions.
We begin in Section 2 by presenting the underlying mathematical model and
introducing some necessary notation. Section 3 presents analytical solutions to
budgeting problems where the aim is to satisfy fairness in regard to achievability
and responsiveness, respectively. The results are illustrated in a numerical exam-




We consider a company with n divisions that are supervised by subordinate man-
agers who each have to report to a single superior. The general aim is to set a
target budget vi for the revenue of division i, i = 1, . . . , n. The main inputs used
in this regard are the probabilistic information on the random variables of the rev-
enues Yi, i = 1, . . . , n, of the divisions, and the proposed budgets di by the divisions’
managers. We denote by Fi(.) the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of Yi,
i = 1, . . . , n. For simplicity of exposition we assume here that the Fi(.) are contin-
uous. The Fi(.), i = 1, . . . , n, contain all the probabilistic information on Y1, . . . , Yn
when they are assumed independent and otherwise the multivariate distribution of





The distribution of Ytot is completely determined by the marginal distributions Fi(.),
or alternatively the multivariate distribution of Y when revenues are dependent.
Throughout we use the suffix tot to denote summation over all divisions of the





In the idealistic situation in which the top manager can fully rely on his subor-
dinates’ proposals, the trivial solution to the budget setting problem seems to be
to set vi = di , and consequently, vtot =
∑n
i=1 di. However, this approach has two
major drawbacks:
i) Otley and Berry (1979) observed that proposed budgets di that correspond to
challenging probabilities of achievement for the divisions can lead to a virtually
impossible to reach budget for the company as a whole. Mathematically, when
Pr(Yi ≥ di) = βi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n with βi < 0.5, then typically one has that
Pr(Ytot ≥
∑n
j=1 dj) = α max1≤i≤n βi.
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ii) A well-known phenomenon is the incentive of managers to create budgetary
slack. They may for example want to obtain a budget that is easy to achieve,
especially when this budget is used for evaluation purposes. Consequently, the
di may not represent reasonable estimates.
Thus, setting target budgets as proposed by the subordinates and then using their
aggregate as the company target budget is not the right thing to do. However,
participation in the process of budget setting can make the subordinate manager
more committed to it and can thus improve performance. Therefore, large deviations
from the proposed di may not be desirable.
Given the above, the top manager should set the vi in such a way that two
objectives are met. The primary objective concerns the total budget vtot. The goal
here is the achievability of the total budget vtot or, more precisely, that Pr(Ytot ≥
vtot) ≥ α, for a prespecified α (0 ≤ α ≤ 1). Then, since targets are also used for the
evaluation of the subordinate’s performance, the division of vtot into vi, i = 1, . . . , n,
should be “fair” in terms of two objectives: the probabilities of achievement for the
subordinate managers, and the degree in which the target vi deviates from the
proposed di, should not differ too much among subordinates.
Several potential solutions are considered here and they all follow the same pat-
tern: first find the maximal level of vtot that yields an acceptable probability of




where FYtot(.) denotes the cdf of Ytot, and then allocate vtot to the divisions so as to
satisfy other managerial objectives as stated above.
3 Budget solutions for the achievability and res-
ponsiveness objectives
We first obtain solutions for each of the fairness objectives separately with the re-
quirement being complete fairness with regard to the objective concerned. However,
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an optimal solution with respect to one objective may not perform well with respect
to the other one. This may require some balancing between the objectives and this
issue is considered in Section 4.
3.1 Solution for the achievability objective
The probability of achievement of the budget vi set to division i, i = 1, . . . , n, is
given by
βi = Pr(Yi ≥ vi), i = 1, . . . , n, (3)
and complete fairness in that regard among divisions exists if
βi = β, for all i = 1, . . . , n, (4)
for some β ∈ [0, 1], i.e. all the divisions have the same probability of achievement
for their respective budgets.
Then, following our pattern, the problem that needs to be solved is: given a
prespecified probability of achievement α for the overall budget, find (v1, . . . , vn)
with
∑n
j=1 vj = vtot, and β such that
Pr(Ytot ≥ vtot) = α,
and Pr(Yi ≥ vi) = β, for all i = 1, . . . , n.
(5)
Since the Fi(.) are continuous, there is a unique solution for (5), but in general
there is no useful explicit representation for it. However, for the collections of
distributions that possess the location-scale property such a general explicit solution
is possible. This location-scale property is defined by the existence, for all i, of






, i = 1, . . . , n,
for some cdf G(.) that does not depend on (ai, bi). Well-known families of distri-
butions that posses this property are the normal, uniform, exponential and if the
shape parameter is kept fixed also the the gamma and Weibull distribution.
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Then, since G(.) and Fi(.) are continuous, (4) can be rewritten as

















Combined with (1) this yields the target budgets
vi = ai + bi
vtot − atot
btot
, i = 1, . . . , n, (6)






, i = 1, . . . , n. (7)
We now illustrate the above procedure for the normal family of distributions, i.e.
we consider the case where
Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn) ∼ N (µ,Σ), (8)
where µ = (µ1, . . . , µn) is the (marginal) means vector and Σ = [σij] i=1,... ,n
j=1,... ,n
the
covariance matrix with σij denoting the covariance of Yi and Yj (i, j = 1, . . . , n).
Note that this includes as a special case the situation with independence between
divisions’ revenues, which corresponds to Σ being diagonal.
It then follows that
Yi ∼ N(µi, σ2i ), i = 1, . . . , n,
Ytot ∼ N (µtot, σ2),
where σi :=
√
σii, and σ :=
√
e′Σe, with e := (1, . . . , 1).
For a given α it then follows from (2) that
vtot = µtot + zασ, (9)
where zα is the (1 − α)th quantile of the standard normal distribution. Next, we
use the fact that the normal distribution has a location-scale parameter, with G(.)
in this case being the standard normal distribution function and ai = µi, bi = σi,
i = 1, . . . , n. When these parameters are substituted into (6) we obtain
vi = µi +
σi
σtot
zασ, i = 1, . . . , n, (10)
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Notice that (11), when inverted, provides a general formula for effects observed by
Otley and Berry (1979):
• Consider the case with independent revenues. Then targets vi that correspond
to reasonable values of β can lead to a very small α, i.e. a virtually impossible















i . If the ratio between σtot and σ is relatively large, then the
difference between α and β will be large. For instance, if all the σi are equal,
then σtot/σ increases as
√
n, and can thus be large even for moderate values
of n.
α 0.05 0.30 0.50 0.75 0.95
β 0.28 0.43 0.50 0.59 0.72
(13)
The table in (13) shows an example of the relationship between α and β for
the case of n = 8, with each division having normally distributed revenue with
σi = 4. Notice that a reasonably optimistic probability of achievement of 0.28
for the divisions leads to a very low probability of achievement of 0.05 for the
company as a whole.
• Positive correlation between the divisions’ revenues makes the difference be-





i , and α < 0.5, then the resulting vtot will be higher, and consequent-
ly β will be lower, than in the independence case. The opposite holds when
α > 0.5. Consequently, the difference between α and β will be smaller than
in the independence case when there is positive correlation between divisions’
revenues.
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Equivalently, (11) implies that when α < 0.5, the solution to (5) yields β > α.
It can be argued that high β can create laxness in the attitudes of the divisions’
managers. Another objective, therefore, could be minimization of the probability
of achievement of the manager that has the easiest budget (and thereby setting the
lowest possible upper bound for the probabilities of achievement to all managers).






s.t. P (Ytot ≥ vtot) = α.
(14)
It is obvious however that the optimal solution to this problem satisfies (4).
Indeed, imagine for example that in an optimal solution (v1, . . . , vn) of (14) one
has βk = max1≤i≤n βi > βj, for some j. Then, by reallocating part of vj to vk,
while keeping vtot fixed, one can decrease βk and still have that βk ≥ βj, which
contradicts the optimality of (v1, . . . , vn). Thus, any solution to (14) satisfies (4),
and is therefore equal to the unique solution of problem (5).
3.2 Solution for the responsiveness objective
Another important aspect the top manager has to take into account is the effect of
budgetary participation. Positive effects of budgetary participation on performance
are known from the literature.1 In our model budgetary participation is incorporated
through the proposed budgets di, i = 1, . . . , n, by the managers. The “closeness”
between the set budget vi and the proposed budget di can then be seen as the degree
to which the division’s manager effectively participated in the budgetary process.
In view of that the top manager wants a set budget vi to be as close as possible to
the proposed budget di, i = 1, . . . , n. As a measure to the “closeness” of vi to di we
choose the ratio ki = vi/di.
As we did with the achievability objective it is assumed that the manager, when
using this objective, wants the ratios ki to be equal for all managers. This yields
1After seminal works of e.g. Buckley and McKenna (1972) and Brownell (1982), an extensive
literature has been developed on this issue. See e.g. Magner et al. (1995).
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the following problem: find budgets (v1, . . . , vn), and a ratio k, satisfying
P (Ytot ≥ vtot) = α,
and vi = kdi, i = 1, . . . , n.
(15)




di, i = 1, . . . , n. (16)
Now consider the case where vtot > dtot. Then the top manager knows that at
least one manager has to receive a revised budget that is higher than his proposed
budget. Therefore, another objective may be to minimize ki = vi/di for the manager
who gets the budget that yields the highest ki (and thereby setting the lowest possi-







s.t. P (Ytot ≥ vtot) = α.
(17)
As we saw earlier with the previous objective, it is again apparent that problems
(15) and (17) have the same solution. When vtot < dtot, problem (17) can be altered
to a max-min problem that also results in the same solution as in (16).
3.3 A numerical example
We now demonstrate the budget setting approaches above by a numerical example.
Consider a company with eight divisions. Their distributions are normal distribu-
tions N(10, σi) with
σi = 2, i = 1, . . . , 4,
σi = 4, i = 5, . . . , 8.
(18)
The subordinates propose the following target budgets:
d1 = 8, d2 = 9, d3 = 10, d4 = 11,
d5 = 8, d6 = 9, d7 = 10, d8 = 11.
(19)
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Notice that although managers i = 1, 2, 3, and 4 have the same revenue distri-
bution, they propose different targets. Whereas manager 1 is relatively pessimistic
(P (Y1 ≥ d1) > 0.5), manager 4 is more optimistic (P (Y4 ≥ d4) < 0.5).
Now assume that the top manager wants to set a total budget vtot that is achiev-
able with probability α = 0.3.
First we consider a situation with independent budgets. The distribution of the
total revenues Ytot is then given by N (µtot, σ2), with µtot = 80, and σ2 = 80. The
optimal set budgets for the achievability and responsiveness objective can be easily






















Table 1: The achievability (a) and responsiveness (b) objective
unique solution where the di are revised in such a way that the existing differences
in probabilities of achievement vanish. If he wants to revise the di with equal
proportions for all agents, the solution is found in Table 1(b). The last rows in
Tables 1(a) and (b), present vtot, maxi,j {βi − βj}, and maxi,j {ki − kj}.
Let us now consider a situation with dependence. The marginal distributions of the
Yi are the same as before, but Y is now given by (8) with correlation coefficients
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ρij = σij/(σiσj) = 0.9, for all i 6= j. Tables 2(a) and (b), present solutions for the






















Table 2: The achievability (a) and responsiveness (b) objective
with dependence
Comparing with Tables 1(a) and (b), we observe that
i) The positive correlations between the divisions’ revenues result in a higher
variance of Ytot (V (Ytot) = e′Σe = 526.4, compared to V (Ytot) = 80 in the in-
dependence case). Consequently, the required total budget in the dependence
case (vtot = 92.03) is significantly higher than the required total budget in the
independence case (vtot = 84.69).
ii) For the achievability objective, the probability of achievement β for the di-
visions has decreased since the total budget vtot to be allocated among the
divisions has increased. In particular, the difference between α and β reduces
from 0.1225 (see Table 1(a)) to 0.0081 (see Table 2(a)) as a consequence of the
positive correlation between the divisions.
iii) For the responsiveness objective, the k has increased, and hence positive cor-
relation has a negative effect on the performance of this criterion.
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So, both in the cases of independence and dependence, it is possible to find
targets that achieve perfect fairness with regard to either one of the objectives.
Notice however that, for the achievability objective in the independence case for
example, the top manager has to increase the proposed budget of manager 5 by
34.77%, whereas he has to decrease the proposed budget of manager 4 by 5.54%, in
order to do away with differences in probability of achievement. More generally, we
observe that the solution for the complete fairness with regard to the achievability
objective does not perform well for the responsiveness objective and on the other
hand the solution for complete fairness with regard to the responsiveness objective
does not perform well for the achievability objective. We therefore consider combined
objectives.
4 Combined objectives
Since a division according to (15) completely relies on the targets di proposed by
the subordinates, and does not take into account potential different attitudes with
respect to budgetary slack, such a division may be very unfair with respect to the
achievement objective. On the other hand, if budgets are set so as to achieve equal
probabilities of achievement (problem (5)), then it is unlikely that the resulting
solution also achieves fairness with respect to responsiveness (as in (15)), because
the latter depends on the di whereas the former does not.
In view of the above, some control of the other objective can be achieved by


















{βi − βj} ≤ ρ2, and (2).
(21)
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In these problems instead of perfect fairness with respect to one objective the best
possible result is achieved while keeping a lid, as represented by the preset constants
ρ1 and ρ2, on the other objective. To illustrate the above, we return to the example
in Section 3.3 with independence between divisions’ revenues.
To find a better balance between the two objectives we turn to the optimization
problems (20) or (21). First, consider the problem defined by (20), with the limit on
the difference between the ki set at ρ1 = 0.3. Numerical optimization of this model






















Table 3: Combined objectives
with the limit on the differences between the βi at ρ2 = 0.2, yields the results shown
in Table 3(b).
We see, for instance, that where the maximal difference between the βi when the
ki are equal, is 0.5768 (see Table 1(b)) it can be decreased to 0.20, with the “price”
for that being some variability in the ki, more precisely, a maximal difference of
0.2362 between them (see Table 3(b)). In general, the manager can make the desired
tradeoff between the two objectives by choosing one of the two problems, (20) or
(21), with a corresponding value for ρi.
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5 Conclusions
The paper provides a formal consideration of the issue of budget setting to divisions.
A key aspect of the modelling is the incorporation of the inherent uncertainties in
future revenues.
The focus is on the two managerial objectives, as viewed from the top manage-
ment, of budget achievability and budgetary participation. Balancing is required to
ensure that managers are treated fairly and in a considerate manner with respect to
both objectives while the top manager’s constraints on the total budget achievabil-
ity is controlled. This can be achieved by formulating optimization problems which
transform the above requirements into exact quantitative terms. Such problems
can then be solved for different modelling settings yielding desirable budget setting
solutions.
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